Selected Papers (pre-publication version)

(The following paper is an earlier draft of the published version).


Pp 101-134 in Kieran McEvoy and Tim Newburn (eds.),
Criminology and Conflict Resolution. London: Macmillan, 2003.

          Jim Thomas, Julie Capps, James Carr, Tammie Evans,
         Wendy Lewin-Gladney, Deborah Jacobson, Chris Maier,
                    Scott Moran, and Sean Thompson
        Northern Illinois University / DeKalb, IL 60115 (USA)
                           (10 April, 2000)

(Early draft of paper forthcoming in: Kieran McEvoy and Tim Newburn (eds.),
Criminology and Conflict Resolution. London: Macmillan.)

We are indebted to Kevin Anderson, Jim Edwards, Kieran McEvoy,  Harry
Mika, Richard Quinney,  Dennis Sullivan,  and Larry Tifft for sharing
their insights and stimulating our thinking.  We also thank colleagues
and others at the 1999 American Society of Criminology annual meetings
in Toronto  for tolerating  our often  persistent questions  about
     Nobody is very  likely to consider a  doctrine true merely
     because it  makes people happy or  virtuous--except perhaps
     the lovely "idealists" who become  effusive about the good,
     the true,  and the beautiful and allow all kinds of motley,
     clumsy,  and benevolent desiderata to  swim around in utter
     confusion in their pond (Nietzsche, 1966: 49).
     In the past decade,  a growing number of scholars have attempted
to integrate  "being nice" with theoretical  precepts.   Peacemaking
criminology reflects one  such attempt.   Perhaps because  it blends
scholarship and praxis with an ideology  of social harmony and unity,
peacemaking criminology (PMC)  risks being seen as something less than
a rigorous intellectual position,  and more as a philosophical belief
system.   As a consequence,  one goal for advocates lies in expanding
the tenets of PMC beyond the pale  of co-ideologues in order to avoid
the criticism that PMC is just another effusively "feel good" doctrine
promulgated by confused idealists.
     The essays in this volume attest both to the recent growth of the
peacemaking perspective in criminology,   especially the restorative
justice variant,  and to the diversity of ways that practitioners have
attempted to implement its tenets in research and in practice.   Yet,
the increased interest in peacemaking  criminology in the past decade
also has led  to corresponding questions about  its practical utility
and intellectual consistency.  Is the perspective useful as a means to
reduce crime?  Or, is it simply a catch-all phrase used by politically
and intellectually diverse advocates,   with little substantive value
beyond mobilizing  for group hugs  and a  mass chorus of  "We Shall
Overcome?"   This chapter  examines  whether  PMC has  sufficient
intellectual  relevance and  significant  potential for  realistic
applicability,  or whether  it is simply a  muddle-minded means for
idealists to become  "effusive about the good,  the  true,  and the
     Our entry into  this project began when  the volume's co-editor,
Kieran McEvoy,  accepted the suggestion  that our graduate seminar on
the U.S. criminal justice sytem write a collective article.  For some
of us, criminal justice is a practitioners' field in which peacemaking
seems quite alien.   For others of us, peacemaking is something we do
in our daily lives,  something that  seemed unrelated to our academic
pursuits.  A few of us are  actively involved in attempts to humanize
prisons.  All of us were skeptical  of the perspective of peacemaking
criminology, not so much for what it represents,  but for the apparent
confusion surrounding the central tenets, the lack of clear strategies
for implementation,  and the inability or refusal of many adherents to
address the hard questions of  how we,  individually or collectively,
ought respond to specific instances of violence of all types.
     Although some  of our commentary  may seem critical,   we are
unequivocally sympathetic to the perspective,  and it influences much
of our own work.  Yet, we have collective reservations about adopting
the term as a mantel around which  to wrap either our research or our
praxis without first assessing what we wear when we don it.   Many of
our concerns seem either unaddressed by advocates, or, worse,  ignored
as irrelevant to  peacemaking goals.   This risks reducing  PMC to a
feel-good ethos while  limiting adherents to preaching  to the choir.
In re-examining our own views about PMC,  we begin by summarizing its
primary characteristics.   Next, we examine several criticisms of the
perspective,  and  finally we identify  its potential  utility for
mainstream scholars, policy makers, and practitioners.
     We offer two preliminary caveats to guide readers.   First,  our
collective  intellectual ambivalence  occasionally translates  into
discursive mood  swings as  we attempt to  balance the  extreme PMC
positions with those we consider more credible.  However, it is likely
that these swings reflect the diversity  of PMC advocates at least as
much as our own attempts to sort through them.  Second, the occasional
critical tone of  our own effort reflects in part  our agreement with
critics on some  points and our frustration with some  of the leading
PMC advocates to address the critics.  Nonetheless, if we successfully
balance our swings,  our commentary suggests  ways to address some of
the most severe criticisms by illustrating the perspective's potential
for intellectual development and social action.
                     What is Peacemaking Criminology?
     Perhaps we take peacemaking criminology too seriously.
     Then again,  perhaps we should ask why we ought take it seriously
at all.   It probably depends on how  we define it,  where we see it
located in the pantheon  of social theory (if at all),   and of what
practical, ideological, or substantive relevance it has.   There is no
doubt that the  perspective has become more visible  in recent years.
One irony,  however,  is that the more visible it becomes,  the less
substance it seems to have.   Who, after all,  can dispute that it's
better to be nice than not nice, and that pain and suffering should be
     The first difficulty in  assessing peacemaking criminology begins
with identifying a clear, reasonably encompassing definition,  or even
isolating a group of precepts that binds adherents.   The perspective
is not a  theory,  because it lacks an identifiable  core of readily
testable postulates or claims,  contains more vision than explanation,
and does  not seem  amenable to  modification when  confronted with
contentious factual or other challenges.  In fact,  many advocates of
the perspective seem  to avoid addressing criticisms.   It  is not a
systematic philosophy,   because it  contains no  well-articulated
premises or rigorous method for  critiquing,  testing,  or advancing
knowledge.   Although identified with  the discipline of criminology,
peacemaking criminology is not a discipline,  because it possesses no
integrating set  of systematic  theories or  method or  immediately
obvious policy-oriented  guidelines.   Therefore,   we begin  our
exploration of PMC  by initially viewing it as a  perspective,  or a
stance from which to view and comment upon objects within our gaze.
     A peacemaking perspective in the  social sciences is hardly new.
Three decades ago,  Curle (1971)   articulated a detailed theory of
strategies for replacing conflict with  peace,  and journals such as
Humanity and Society  have long nurtured a  social science humanistic
perspective.   But,  as  the bibliographic entries in  this volume
indicate,  the  emergence of a  distinctly criminological  form of
"peacemaking," although it emerged over 20 years ago,  has mushroomed
primarily in  the past decade.   The  growth occurred largely  as a
response to  the perceived futility  of the warmaking  metaphor that
dominates crime  control research  and scholarship  (Arrigo,  1999;
Kraska, 1999;  Pepinsky, 1998a) and in part as a response to the need
to integrate criminal  justice theory and practice  within a broader
framework of basic human needs.
     Although origins of PMC are  often attributed to Richard Quinney
(Akers, 1997;  McEvoy and Gormally,  1997),  The seeds of a kinder,
gentler mainstream criminology  that responded to human  needs rather
than reacted to  human misdeeds were sown especially by  the works of
Tifft (1979),  Tifft and Sullivan (1980)  and Pepinsky (1979).   In
arguing  for minimalist  state  control  structures and  spiritual
rejuvenation as the preconditions for  a just society,  Tifft (1979)
offered one of  the earliest systematic attempts to  establish a base
for a criminology of peacemaking.   Tifft's responsive anarchism was a
call for a society based on love,  one that attends to essential human
needs.   Stressing empathy for the plight of others,  he argued that
existing social structures and forms  of interaction perpetuate human
misery,  and  that crime and  misery are  irrevocably intertwined.
Spiritual rejuvenation requires empathy with  those who,  because of
their social  position,  are more likely  to be relegated  to life
conditions  characterized by  structural inequality,   existential
despair, and physical or mental suffering.
     Developing a similar theme of a humanist social science, Pepinsky
(1979:  250) observed that,  "rather than trying to find out what is,
the humanist uses data  to calculate what can be." In  doing so,  he
contributed to criminology a transformative set of ideals to guide the
emerging perspective as a research direction.   In later refinements,
Pepinsky (1988)  argued that there  is a direct relationship between
violence and social unresponsiveness that  occurs through processes of
depersonalization.   Like Tifft, Pepinsky challenged us to rethink our
conceptualization of  crime and suggested that  an act of  crime is
conventionally defined by nuances of context and motive, a distinction
he rejects (Pepinsky, 1988: 551-553).
     The  articulation of  an explicit  peacemaking perspective  in
criminology arguably began with the  works of Richard Quinney (1988a,
1988b,  1988c),  and further developed by others,  such as Anderson
(1989) and Pepinsky (1998a, 1995, 1988).   Pepinsky and Quinney (1991)
reshaped the perspective with 20 articles by peacemaking proponents in
a single collection that addressed the PMC tradition,  integrated PMC
with other genres such as feminism, and then connected the perspective
to radical/critical criminology.   Their collection not only increased
the visibility  of the  perspective,  but  it also  cast a  wider
intellectual and ideological  net than had previous  works by uniting
scholars who had been writing on the periphery of explicit peacemaking
     Quinney,  the  prime mover in moving  PMC from the  fringes of
criminological awareness toward the center, was the most articulate in
arguing that conventional criminological theory was impoverished.  For
Quinney,  "No amount of thinking and  no amount of public policy have
brought us any  closer to understanding and solving  the problems of
crime" (Quinney,  1988a:  67).   What is needed,  he argued,  is a
fundamentally new paradigm,  one that recognizes that crime is but one
form of violence  among many,  including war,   debilitating social
formations, destructive forms of interaction,  and structural factors
that suppress human potential.  This requires a pro-active approach to
crime and justice characterized by a focus on universal social justice
as the prerequisite to elimination of predatory behavior.
     However, the diversity of practioners' views clouds a clear image
of the contours, implications, and content of peacemaking criminology.
Despite, or more likely because of,  the growing diverse interest the
perspective, like six Pirandellian characters, it remains in search of
a unifying set of authors to provide it with a unique identity.   Many
proponents view  peacemaking criminology as  simply a term  used to
bridge the macro-micro  theoretical and policy chasms  between social
structure, the criminal justice system, and the individual.
     What, then, is peacemaking criminology?   Few, if any,  leading
adherents see it as a theory. Most would accept Sullivan's view that:
     ...peacemaking criminology  is a  perspective,  a  way of
     looking at the  world which on the most  intimate of levels
     means human relationships--how we form them, how we maintain
     them,  and  how we  restore them  when things  go wrong
     (Sullivan, email communication, Dec. 2, 1999).

     Although not all agree with  Mika's coalition-building vision of
PMC,  he nonetheless confronts the definitional problem in an attempt
to recast  it as a way  of pulling and holding  diverse ideological
groups around a core of shared humanism:
     I prefer  to think of  peacemaking criminology  even more
     informally,  where it is a comfortable conversation between
     individuals who subscribe to a very broad range of critical,
     dialectical,  and reflexive orientations  to justice (Mika,
     Although helpful,  these  definitions are vague on  content and
ambiguous on practices, leading both critics and sympathetic observers
to judge the perspective abstruse and lacking practical substance. For
example,  Akers (1997:  183)  sees PMC  as little more than a vague
utopian vision  that,  while  laudable,  is of  little use  as an
explanatory model for crime or for processing offenders.  The tendency
of leading proponents  of the perspective to ignore  or dismiss such
criticisms creates such credibility problems  and feeds the view that
PMC advocates are merely lovely idealists swimming around in befuddled
                          Addressing the Critics
     Is PMC internally  consistent such that it even  makes sense to
talk about it as a coherent body of thought,  other than "it's nice to
be nice?"  Or, does it offer something substantively new with which to
supplement, even replace, conventional criminological theory?
     In pulling together the most salient criticisms of PMC,  we drew
from five sources.   First, published commentaries directed attention
to problems conventional scholars identify with PMC.   However, unlike
the  acrimonious debates  surrounding  the  emergence of  critical
criminology in the 1970s (Inciardi, 1980;  Taylor,  Walton and Young,
1974),  PMC has  not yet generated such  passionate opposition.  We
attribute this  partly to the  relative newness of  the perspective,
partly to  the degree  to which  critical perspectives  have become
mainstream,  and  partly to the possibility  that PMC is  not taken
seriously by mainstream scholars either  as a threatening alternative
perspective or,  more damning,  as  a viable intellectual position.
Electronic discussions  groups,  or "listservs," provided  a second
source of criticisms. The discussion group of the Critical Criminology
Division   of   the   American   Society   of   Criminology
(  was particularly useful,  and we
also drew from other groups specializing in peacemaking issues such as
restorative justice and opposition to  capital punishment.  A private
discussion group  created to discuss peacemaking  provided additional
critiques.  Third, we solicited email commentary both from PMC critics
and advocates.    Fourth,  Web  publications provided  additional
commentary.  However,  because of the  inconsistency and often poor
quality of Web material, we used it primarily as heuristic guidelines.
Finally,  we drew most heavily from conference sessions and formal and
informal discussions with  critics and advocates attending  the 1999
annual meetings of the American Criminological Association in Toronto.
Because many of the criticims of  PMC came from sympathetic observers,
and because  many of  the observers  expressed friendship  with or
collegial affiliation with leading PMC advocates,  their comments were
used with permission on the condition of anonymity.
     One might ask,  as did one advocate,  "Why bother responding to
critics at all?   It's better to just do  peacemaking rather argue."
There are several compelling reasons  for responding to criticisms of
PMC.  First,   many criticisms,  such  as as PMC's  similarity to
functionalism, are based on misconceptions that, if unaddressed,  take
on an iterative, self-perpetuating character.   Second, responding to
critics moves PMC away  from the perception that it is  only a "feel
good" philosophy that elevates ideology  above critique and discourse.
Third,  by raising critical issues,   we can generate discussion of
demonstrable shortcomings in  the perspective as a  way of overcoming
them.   Fourth, addressing criticisms against PMC also helps identify
differences  within the  perspective by  illustrating the  various
intellectual  traditions that  influence practitioners.    Finally,
addressing  the intellectual  and other  problems increases  PMC's
credibility, and hopefully raises recognition of its viability.
     From published literature,  electronic sources,  and conference
interactions we selected the most common or (to us)  most interesting
criticisms and sorted them into  five broad thematic categories.  We
call these categories "syndromes" to  capture the image of symptomatic
imbalance between PMC and scholars expressing discomfort with it.  The
five syndromes focus on the criticisms  that PMC is incompatible with
Marxian/radical theories; is theoretically akin to functionalism;  is
inherently conservative; reflects overwhelming intellectual chaos; and
lacks intellectual or empirical credibility.
     Some of the criticisms are relatively simple and can be expressed
briefly. Others, more complex, require more elaboration.   We respond
directly to three of the critical syndromes,  but two others--those of
"chaos" and "conservatism" we expand in separate sections.
     Although there is little in PMC that is explicitly Marxist, it is
often associated with Marxian, radical/critical,  or conflict theories
because some of the most visible  proponents are associated with those
theories.   For example, Quinney's early works (1978,  1974,  1970)
reflect influences  of phenomenology,  Marx,  and  conflict theory,
prompting one commentator to describe him as "conventional,  conflict
oriented,  critical,   neo-Marxist,  and more  recently prophetic"
(Friedrichs, 1980: 48-49).   Others, such as Tifft and Pepinsky, have
also been classified as  critical criminologists (Friedrichs,  1980;
Thomas and  O'Maolchatha,  1989)  or  within the  radical conflict
perspective (Beirne and Messerschmidt, 533-534;  Williams and McShane,
1994: 162-16).
     However,  the peacemaking perspective seems  to some critics the
antithesis of traditional "radical" positions such as conflict theory,
critical theory, or Marxian-oriented perspectives.  Akers (1997: 184),
for example,  has argued that it is  contradictory to claim Marx as a
significant theoretical basis, because of Marx's own emphasis on class
conflict and non-rejection of violence as the means for social change.
In this view,  the Marxian warmaking  metaphor of social struggle and
the necessity  of class conflict lie  in opposition to a  vision of
peacemaking.   Bohm (1997:  132) notes that PMC can be criticized for
extreme idealism  and excessive  focus on  transforming individuals
rather transforming society.   Some radical theorists suggest that PMC
advocates have  sacrificed the  radical/Marxian emphasis  on social
action to utopian contemplation:
     ...we challenge  progressive academics to also  think about
     Marx's  simple,  but  profound  thesis  that while  the
     WAYS, THE POINT IS TO CHANGE IT.  We believe that it is time
     for criminologists to stop THINKING about peace and to start
     MAKING it (Currie and MacLean, 1995:  108;  all italics in
     Others within the Marxian tradition are skeptical of the ultimate
value of PMC to significantly change repressive structural conditions,
arguing that:
     ...reforming subparts of the totality to make them more user
     friendly (informal)   is actually  "another turn  of the
     ideological screw" (Rick Abel)   whereby folks are coopted
     into believing that something important  has changed when it
     has  not and  that instead  of dealing  with the  wider
     structural issues, these are further masked.  Then,  if the
     outcomes  are more  humane but  problems persist,   the
     mainstream can blame the alternatives for failing, being too
     lenient etc., and thereby excuse themselves while holding on
     to power (Henry, 2000).
     Whether PMC diverges  from or contradicts Marxian  or any other
theory may be a matter of profound indifference to PMC advocates,  but
because the  criticism is  used to  discredit PMC,   it is  worth
     A second concern with peacemaking  criminology raised by critics
at the  American Society  of Criminology  conference centers  on a
perceived congruence with functionalism.    While this criticism was
neither the most common nor the most  serious,  it is one of the most
interesting,  both because of the nature  of the claim and because it
has been used against Marxian-oriented perspectives in the past.   The
view that PMC resembles functionalism is  based on the perception that
both share the concept of "harmony" as central to the position,  that
both are excessively utopian,  and that because Marx was an (alleged)
functionalist,  PMC's Marxian/critical roots also carry functionalist
baggage.   Unlike the  core of conflict theory,   which holds that
conflict is  a fundamental part of  the social process and  that all
societies rest  upon constraint  of some  members by  others (e.g.,
Chambliss and Siedman,  1971),  the leading PMC advocates reject the
necessity of conflict,   or "negative peace," which  is any coercive
apparatus--such as  the criminal justice system--used  against people
who challenge a preferred social order (Quinney, 1998: 358).  Because
the basis of peacemaking lies on establishing harmony and reducing the
structural conditions,  status hierarchies,  and interactional styles
that facilitate conflict,  some skeptics have suggested that,  if we
substitute "consensus"  with "peacemaking,"  we have  a variant  of
functionalism.  In this view, the telos of peace or harmony is seen as
driving social behavior and institutions.  Because of functionalism's
tenets that all social systems are based on consensus (Parsons,  1937)
or that crime is "normal" (Durkheim,  1951),   it is seen by some as
inherently conservative (Bohm, 1997:  84) or at best as fulfilling the
liberal ideal of the world (Smith, 1966).   Dahrendorf (1958)  argued
that functionalism is another form of  utopian theory,  and as such,
neither fruitful nor realistic. Others (eg. Fallding, 1972; Szymanski,
1972) have argued that Marx was, in fact, a functionalist.  Hence, for
some critics it then follows  that because the peacemaking perspective
also is based on consensus and  harmony,  is utopian,  and underlies
Marxian perspectives,   it is  likewise a  de facto  conservative
teleological view.
     A third criticism also suggests  that PMC is conservative,  not
because of ideological or theoretical  assumptive premises,  such as
those found in functionalism,  but because of an irony inherent in the
core values  of advocates.   In  this view,  voiced  especially by
political militants and community activists, the emphasis on peace and
the over-riding  tenet to  reject conflict,   especially violence,
ultimately supports,  even strengthens,  an oppressive status quo by
espousing a passive, impotent, and generally ineffective belief system
that leads to martyrdom rather than social change.   For example, some
critics point to Quinney's  (1993)  existential reflections espousing
personal and  intellectual mysticism  and wholistic  spiritualism as
evidence of the "beastly beatitudes"  of PMC.   Others cite Quinney's
(1991:  348)  observation that  peacemaking criminologists need not
directly engage in  conflict but,  can instead bear  witness to the
suffering brought about by exploitation, poverty, greed,  hate,  and
inequality as evidence of excessive pacifism at a best,  "acquiescence
to evil"  at worst.   In the  critic's view,  victims do  not need
witnesses, they need warriors:
     Kitty Genovese {a  woman stabbed to death in  New York City
     while 38  people witnessed the  attack for 35  minutes and
     failed to report it} had  witnesses who watched over nearly
     two hours as her assailant stabbed her to death.  She didn't
     need witnesses.  She needed someone to intervene. And that's
     my problem with peacemaking criminologists.  They are silent
     on the question of how we should intervene in unpleasantness
     (Anonymous conference critic,  1999,   American Society of
     Criminology Meetings).
     Some  critics judge  that the  spiritual  unity advocated  by
peacemaking criminologists  presupposes a hive mentality  that would
replace democratic  pluralism with homogeneous  passivity (Anonymous
conference critic, 1999,   American Society of Criminology).   In the
view of these critics, direct conflict, whether in the form of hostile
arguments,  direct confrontation,  or even the necessity of physical
intervention,  may be  necessary to fight injustice  or reduce harm.
Failure to do  otherwise,  in this view,   is simply self-indulgent
intellectualist idealism  that a  privileged few  can enjoy  at the
expense of others less fortunate.
     A fourth criticism centers on  the seemingly chaotic diffusion of
intellectual threads, a tendency toward excessive hyperbole,  seeingly
naive or contradictory views,  and the  lack of a clear definition of
"peacemaking." These  critics point to the  ideological,  polemical,
discursive,   and intellectual  diversity of  those advocating  a
peacemaking approach to justify the claim that PMC is little more than
a hodge-podge of disconnected ideas.   In this view, PMC is a dogmatic
ideological ideal,  one not requiring  serious thinking and therefore
not deserving of being taken seriously.   Unfortunately, these critics
are aided by the occasional hyperbole or shoddy thinking of adherents,
especially by  those who push the  limits of pacifism  by remaining
silent on the  question of how to  deal with violence and  those who
commit it.
     For example,  the argument that we should expunge not only deeds,
but words or even thoughts that are "warlike," that generate "negative
peace," or that make others feel bad, seems not only unrealistic,  but
dangerously utopian.   Gilligan (1997)  is among those extending the
peace metaphor beyond advocating social  justice by calling for social
arrangements that  eliminate destructive emotional states,   such as
feelings of shame.   For Gilligan, the emotion of shame is the primary
cause of all  violence.  This would seem not only  to lack empirical
credibility,  but also subverts the work of other scholars associated
with PMC.  For example, Braithwaite (1989), often cited by peacemaking
scholars as a significant exemplar, argues the opposite:   A society's
capacity to instill in an offender  the recognition of an offense and
to  generate   a  corresponding  internalization   of  empathic
responsibility--shame--constitutes  a  powerful   social  control
mechanism.   Unlike Gilligan, who sees shame as a necessary,  albeit
insufficient, cause of violence,  Braithwaite sees it both as a means
of social control and  as a peaceful way to redress  a wrong after a
violation has occurred.   Such an  irreconcilably bipolar spectrum on
such fundamental  concepts makes  it difficult for  some to  find a
credible intellectual core.
     Other critics point to the view that holding persons,  including
offenders,  responsible for their actions,  reinforces the warmaking
rather than peacemaking model.   Perhaps  because he is considered a
leading PMC scholar,  Harold Pepinsky often becomes targeted as one of
the more extreme examples of polemical aerobics.   In advocating what
he describes  as the Navaho style  of response to  social breaching,
Pepinsky argues that  healing and reconciliation through  dialog are
preferable to the concept of responsibility:
     Everyone leaves a truly balanced conversation free to choose
     what s/he does next.   To the Navajo as to me,   it is a
     contradiction in terms to make someone responsible;  rather,
     a peacemaking process  liberates one's heart to  be in tune
     with others and  to continue taking turns  in interaction.
     Participating in  a balanced conversation  stimulates one's
     assumption of responsibility (Pepinsky, 1998b).
     The  principle of  balance and  reconciliation underlies  the
practice of  restorative justice,  a  form of  conciliatory social
response to  offenses,  seen as a  way to implement  PMC programs.
Critics note that the underlying  assumptions of this approach include
the belief that  there is a consensus on a  "spiritually correct" and
universal normative order;  that participants  possess the ability to
assess an offense and resolve it; That all parties participate willing
and are not subject to norms  subtlely coercing obedience;  and that
status and other  power asymmetries will not intrude  in the process.
However, one criminal justice practitioner responsible for integrating
restorative  justice programs  both  within  and outside  of  the
conventional criminal justice process became somewhat more critical of
the ideal following his own experiences:
     I have  been thinking about  the concept  {of restorative
     justice}  in  terms  of my  own  tribe's  history  and
     culture...I'm  skeptical  about   the  concept  working
     effectively. Restorative justice is derived from communities
     that could restore balance  because of several constraints.
     Religion has traditionally played a major role. In the Osage
     tradition, in order to pay respect to Wa-kon-da (God),  one
     would live a  very structured and purposeful  life.  Daily
     ceremonies,  adherence  to many tribal customs,   and the
     structure of  the society  itself,  depended  upon these
     beliefs.  Furthermore, each of the twenty-four tribal clans
     had their own specific sets  of ceremonies and brought their
     own unique contributions  to the tribe as a  whole.  If a
     tribal member was not in harmony, loosely defined here,  the
     clan  or tribal  priests  would  take notice  (Personal
     communication,  anonymous Illinois  criminal justice agency
     practitioner, February, 2000).
     In this view, the appeals for implementing the perceived peaceful
practices of other cultures make nice rhetoric,  but they are at best
misguided and at  worst dangerously misconceived for  several reasons
(Levrant, et.  al., 1999).   First,  peacemaking practices may hide
deeper control elements  that are far less peaceful,   of which the
"balanced conversation" is the most  visible outcome.  Second,  the
practices may be just one social  response among many,  and reserved
only for less-serious transgressions.  Third, restorative practices in
other cultures may  be more than an attempt to  reconcile victim and
offender;  they  may also  be a means  of mediating  between other
competing caste,  class,  or kinship groups.  Finally,  restorative
practices emerge from  and are located within a  cultural context of
duties, obligations,  and expectations.  Therefore,  seeing them as
something that can be readily translated into a viable practice in our
own system may be unrealistic.
     "Balanced healing  conversations" between victims  and offenders
may seem a nice ideal,  skeptics argue,  but they tend to be reactive
rather than  proactive,  and  there is  little evidence  that they
contribute--even in  cultures that  practice them--to  less frequent
predations than in cultures that do not.  Further,  the definition of
"balanced conversation" might not be shared by all participants,  and
the call for what some see as  "forced reconciliation" can be seen as
perpetuating,  even intensifying,  the feelings of powerlessness and
predation by victims.   Critics suggest  that this type of excessive
hyperbole and linguistic gerrymandering  contributes to the confusion
of PMC's core ideas.   Although Pepinsky is  not alone in the use of
hyperbole,  some critics find his style typical of a "cavalier use of
words and twists  of phrase that leaves readers  shaking their head"
(Anonymous conference critic, 1999,  American Society of Criminology).
Among  the examples  provided  in the  1999  American Society  of
Criminology conference discussions included  the rejection of prisons
(Mathiesen, 1998)  or the call to govern them democratically (Pepinsky
1998:  2),  the suggestion that a  surgeon who accidentally causes a
patient's death during  a heart operation should be  held a criminal
(Pepinsky,  1988:  546),  or that "obedience" is part of the warlike
culture and should be opposed (Pepinsky, 1998b).   One ASC conference
critic, citing Pepinsky (1998b),  argued that some PMC advocates tend
to exaggerate the warmaking metaphor  of conventional criminology with
questionable lexicological twists:
     We follow  the warmaking approach  when we join  others in
     trying to separate  or disconnect our destiny  from that of
     our  enemies--those who  in  our  eyes embody  violence.
     "Offenders" is a  word we use for enemies.   We follow the
     peacemaking approach  when we accommodate  victims instead,
     weaving ourselves together in trust  that we have friends to
     be safe with whenever violence threatens or hurts (Pepinsky,
     1998b: 242).
     Some critics  argue that the  heart of  peacemaking necessarily
requires that individuals, as moral agents,  accept and act upon their
responsibility to others.  Further, the goal of peacemaking is,  at a
minimum,  to promote  acquiescence to a harmonious  and egalitarian
social order and the  acceptance of one's duty,  which is  a form of
obedience,  to the  normative authority of the  principles of peace.
Therefore,  it arguably  follows that rejection of  concepts such as
responsibility, shame,  or obedience,  subverts one essential goal of
peacemaking,  which  is to  socialize social  members to  follow a
pre-ordained set of pre- and proscriptive harmony-inducing norms.   In
addition,  say critics,   rhetorical ploys that rely  on selective
lexicological twists or evoke simplistic  metaphors and images subvert
clear thinking  and conceal the problems  of PMC as  an intellectual
position and as a viable instrument of praxis.
     A fifth criticism is that,  allegedly like many critical/radical
theories,  peacemaking criminology lacks empirical credibility (e.g.,
Inciardi, 1980).   The perspective contains no explanatory postulates,
and its claims  are inherently unamenable to  hypothesis construction
and testing.   Akers (1997:  183-185), for example,  argues that PMC
fails to offer a theory of either  crime or the criminal justice sytem
that can be evaluated empirically.  He argues that although its social
goals may be compatible with some religious tenants,  and although it
might be  possible to  construct testable  claims,  it  remains a
philosophy and a utopian vision rather than a testable body of ideas.
     Critics variously  identify several  difficulties with  testing
peacemaking postulates.   First,  the concept of peace,  or at least
variables reflecting  the concept,  cannot easily  be operationally
defined.  Second, the concept of peace, or at a minimum indicators of
it,  must  be conceptualized as  an independent variable,   a task
associated with positivism,  which many PMC advocates reject as either
intellectually or  ideologically viable.   The common  response that
"peace is the absence of conflict" is unsatisfactory,  because one can
have peace, even "positive peace" (Quinney, 1998:  358), in a context
of social  oppression.   Third,  the  factors that "cause"  or are
associated with peace are not easily identified.  There is,  suggest
critics,   no  compelling  reason  to  think  that  "fairness,"
"responsiveness," or even the vague concept of "justice" are necessary
a priori  conditions of  peace.   Is it  possible to  satisfy the
structural requisites for peace (even if we could identify them)  and
yet have the peace process  subverted by conflict-laden interactional
processes resulting from power asymmetries in gender, race,  or class?
For example,  interactional processes that facilitate a positive group
identity of personal status for all  those involved in an interaction
could be  classified as a  peaceful interaction.   Enough  of these
collectively might create overall peace.   However, if these conformed
to an accepted social order in which power relations were concealed as
the result of ideological blinders,  such as can occur in subtle forms
of interaction influenced by racial or sexual cues,  by what criteria
do we evaluate  "lack of peace," especially if  unnecessary forms of
social domination are invisible?   Fourth  is the problem of finding
reliable data,  qualitative or quantitative,  with interaction as the
unit of analysis.   Fifth,  critics suggest  that even if data were
obtainable,  the development  of a conceptual representation  of the
chain by which peace results would be insurmountable.   Finally, even
if the "causes" of peace were  established,  it would be difficult to
demonstrate that the absence of these attributes leads to non-peace.
     If unanswered,  These  criticisms would seem to  leave PMC with
neither practical nor intellectual utility  or credibility.  The task
before us now  is sorting out those criticisms  possessing merit and
those that do not and then assessing what remains in the balance.
                        Responding to Critics
     One problem in working through  the various criticisms--and this
may  be the  primary  problem in  trying  to  define it--lies  a
little-discussed intellectual tension  between adherents.   Arguably,
those working  within PMC  are primarily  influenced by  either the
Enlightenment or the Romantic intellectual traditions.   Although both
traditions share several modernist characteristics, such as a humanist
ontological and  epistemological centering and  a primacy  of human
agency as a force in progressive social change,  they are separated by
a fundamentally different world view of humanity and knowledge:
       Whereas for the Enlightenment-scientific mind,  nature was
     an object  for observation  and experiment,   theoretical
     explanation  and  technological manipulation,   for  the
     Romantic, by contrast, nature was a live vessel of spirit, a
     translucent source of mystery and revelation.  The scientist
     too wished to penetrate nature and reveal its mystery;  but
     the method and goal of that penetration,  and the character
     of that  revelation,  were different from  the Romantic's.
     Rather than the distanced object of sober analysis,  nature
     for the Romantic  was that which the human  soul strove to
     enter and unite  with in an overcoming  of the existential
     dichotomy,  and  the revelation  he sought  was not  of
     mechanical law but of spiritual essence. While the scientist
     sought truth that was testable and concretely effective, the
     Romantic sought  truth that was inwardly  transfiguring and
     sublime (Tarnas, 1991: 367).
     For some,  perhaps a minority,  PMC possesses a way to integrate
Enlightenment principles  of progress and  humanism into  theory and
practice (McEvoy, 2000;  Mika, 1987,  1992;  Mika and Zehr,  1998).
Others,  influenced more by Romanticism's  de-emphasis of reason and
celebration of the  "inner soul," view peacemaking  criminology as a
spiritual enterprise.   Quinney's nine observations  on which his own
foundation  for peacemaking  lies  embody  a rejection  of  many
Enlightenment principles and  embrace a Romantic style  that typifies
much PMC:
     (1)  Thought of the Western  rational mode is conditional,
     limiting knowledge to what is already known.  (2) The truth
     of reality is emptiness;  all that  is real is beyond human
     conception.  (3)  Each life is a spiritual journey into the
     unknown and the unknowable, beyond the egocentric self.  (4)
     Human existence  is characterized by suffering;   crime is
     suffering;  and the sources of suffering are within each of
     us.  (5) Through love and compassion, beyond the egocentric
     self, we can end suffering and live in peace, personally and
     collectively; (6) The ending of suffering can be attained in
     a quieting of the mind and an opening of the heart, in being
     aware.  (7)   Crime can be ended  only with the  end of
     suffering,  only  when there  is peace--through  love and
     compassion found in awareness.  (8) Understanding, service,
     justice:  All these flow naturally from love and compassion,
     from mindful attention  to the reality of all  that is here
     and now.  (9)   A CRIMINOLOGY OF PEACEMAKING  [italics in
     original},  the  nonviolent criminology of  compassion and
     service,  seeks to end suffering and thereby eliminate crime
     (Quinney, 1991: 3-4).
     PMC's critics  tend toward  an Enlightenment-based  critique of
PMC's "Romantic wing."  This one-sided focus exaggerates the empirical
weaknesses  while  ignoring the  Enlightenment-influenced  aspects.
Although the implications  of PMC as a merging of  two traditions are
beyond the scope of this paper,  our discussion emphasizes the shared
features of Romantic and Enlightenment  advocates.   Our own thinking
lies firmly  within the Enlightenment  tradition,  but as  in most
attempts to create dichotomies,  the two traditions sometimes overlap
in our thinking and discourse.
     Distinguishing  between  the  Enlightenment  and  Romanticist
characteristics of PMC is useful for  at least four reasons.   First,
this  shared framework  suggests basic  compatibility rather  than
necessary opposition.   Second,  an Enlightenment foundation sets PMC
apart from other perspectives that might  advocate peace based on the
authority of religious doctrine rather  than rational critique.  This
distinction is  useful when  contrasting PMC  with other  so-called
"peacemakers," such as the "Religious Right" or "Christian Coalition."
Third,  the  Enlightenment tradition suggests  a line  of empirical
inquiry and action for many PMC  scholars who have been influenced it.
Finally,  by recognizing the overtones of the Enlightenment tradition
underlying PMC,  we can more easily avoid critics' reduction of it to
little more than spiritualism, anti-rationalism, or relativism.
     We begin our responses to the  criticisms by first examining the
Marxian connection.   We pay more  attention to this  criticism not
necessarily because  it is the  most serious,  but  rather because
addressing the underlying  issues provides an opportunity  to display
fundamental--but not immediately  obvious--features of PMC in  a way
that both illustrates the perspective  and highlights similarities and
differences amongst PMC adherents.   Other  criticisms can be managed
more directly  and are  thus more  parsimonious.   We  address the
criticisms of  "intellectual chaos"  and "conservatism"  in separate
sections on PMC  as metaphor and social praxis in  order to integrate
and build on ideas presented in the following section.
     Because so many peacemaking scholars  are associated with Marxian
or conflict-oriented theories,  the criticism that these perspectives
are incompatible with  and even subvert the PMC  position might seem
intellectually  devastating.    However,  there  are  fundamental
congruences between Marx  and PMC.   The integrative  power between
Marxist and  more humanistic  or spiritual  philosophies has  been
illustrated by Arrigo's (2000)  development of Marxian social justice
theory, Anderson's (2000, 1991, 1989) attempts to unify Marx,  Gandhi
and  other humanistic  scholars,  and  Quinney's (1988a,   1988c)
replacement of  western thought with eastern  philosophy.   Anderson
(1991)  has offered  a compelling argument that the  core of Marxian
praxis is grounded in a  humanistic framework that,  like peacemaking
criminology, espouses a peace-based culture and society.
     In addition to shared humanism,  the PMC and Marxian perspectives
share  at least  four common  features:    Partial grounding  in
Enlightenment principles,  a belief in the possibility of transcendent
values,  a view of human nature as malleable and containing potential
for "good," and a commitment to emancipatory social action, or praxis.
     THE  ENLIGHTENMENT  BACKGROUND.   Both  Marxian/radical  and
peacemaking traditions are shaped by Enlightenment principles.  Among
these include the belief in the power of reason; the potential for the
accumulation and application of knowledge to contribute to theoretical
understanding;   the belief  in the  value  of rational  control,
technological enhancement,  and mass communication;  an adherence to
established norms of testing validity claims;  acceptance of the view
of the possibility of establishing  transcendent value premises;  and
the belief in  the possibility of progressive  social change through
human intervention.
     However,  these Enlightenment features are not shared with equal
enthusiasm by PMC scholars influenced by Romanticism.   Quinney (1991:
3), for example, has challenged the "Western rational mode" of knowing
as conditional and incomplete, and Pepinsky (1988)  has challenged the
utility of  positivism in  criminological research.    Others (eg,
Pepinsky, 1995;  Tifft, 1979;  Tifft and Sullivan,  1980)  tend to
emphasize decentralization and the role  of the passionate individual
in creating social order.  Further, judging from the lack of empirical
analysis and assessment of tenets and claims,  there would seem to be
an  indifference among  PMC proponents  to conventional  empirical
scholarship.   However,  it  would be premature to  assume that PMC
scholars  within the  Romanticist tradition  reject rationalism  or
claims-testing,  because the  perspective is built on  the power of
critical thought  and the value  of empirical illustrations  of the
debilitating nature of contemporary social systems.
     TRANSCENDENT VALUES.  Both PMC and Marxian perspectives are based
on the  premise that it  is possible to  establish a set  of fairly
immutable core values on which to  ground behavior and social action.
Quinney (1998)  has argued that,  at  root,  criminology is a moral
philosophy.  The goal for Quinney and others thus becomes substituting
the existing  philosophy that  guides criminal  justice theory  and
practice,  and which fails to provide adequate ethical guidelines for
research or  social action, with one that is more responsive.
     Like PMC advocates,  Marx proceeds  from an unexplicated,  but
nonetheless  visible,  value  system that  includes  an a  priori
Kantian-like categorical  imperative similar to the  fundamental PMC
premise:   Oppression  is wrong.  Derived  from Hegel's  theory of
Objective Spirit  reinterpreted through  a materialistic  framework,
Marx's  condemnation  of  oppressive   social  arrangements  and
corresponding exhortation to struggle for  alternatives aims to reduce
or eliminate unnecessary forms of social domination and control.   In
part deontological,  and in part  constructionist,  Marxian and PMC
perspectives each formulate precepts for  action and interaction that
recognize the fundamental moral imperative of "doing good."  Yet, both
acknowledge the socially contingent nature  of dominant value systems
that subtlely  facilitate conflict  by reinforcing  the ideological
edifice of dominant social relations  while obscuring alternate value
precepts that would enhance, rather than subvert, a peaceful society.
     HUMAN NATURE.   Another way to  examine the relationship between
Marxian-informed and  peacemaking perspectives  lies in  teasing out
their respective views of human nature. "Human nature" is an ambiguous
concept that  risks debates over  whether behavior and  "urges" are
socially constructed  and contextual,  or instead  essentialist and
hard-wired into us. Here, we use the term "human nature" heuristically
(and cautiously) to describe how each perspective begins from,  builds
upon, and seeks to nurture a social order based on a similar vision of
humanity.   Each  presupposes that developing  to the  fullest our
individual and  social potential is  a fundamental condition  of our
species.   Both perspectives see an innate dignity in our species, and
protecting and enhancing that dignity is an integral part of each.
     Peacemaking criminology implicitly rejects  the premise that we,
as a species,   are innately violent and  committed to self-interest
(Gil,  1999).    The destructive behaviors and  debilitating social
structures that often characterize our  culture result from a variety
of factors.  These include constraining modes of knowing, ideological
systems  that  maintain  non-coercive  conceptual  machinery  for
maintaining an  oppressive social order,  social  institutions that
create and reinforce  destructive and unjust social  relations,  and
forms of interaction  that perpetuate individual pain  and suffering
that  results  from  power inequities  and  inegalitarian  social
arrangements.   Both Marxian/Conflict and PMC perspectives see us not
so much in  struggle with our own  nature as we are  with the social
forces that suppress human potential.
     Although he never directly addressed  human nature,  there is in
Marx's writings an implicit view of  it based on a distinction between
"animal nature" and "species nature" (Marx, 1975: 277).  The former we
share with other animals,  but the later is exclusive to our species,
and begins when we organize to produce our means of subsistence (Marx,
1974:  42).   The justification for  the emancipatory potential of a
Marxian perspective draws from this distinction. While people may as a
species share innate characteristics,  they  also possess a socially
contingent nature that depends on  the material conditions that shape
and are  shaped by how people  create and express their  life (Marx,
1974: 42).  As a consequence, material conditions may either constrain
or facilitate attempts to develop our full species potential.  This is
significant for two reasons.  First,  it promotes the view that human
nature is malleable and socially contingent.  Second, it follows from
this that predatory crime is not  an inevitable consequence of "human
     This underlying non-essentialist ethos  in Marx's early writings
is not only  consistent with,  but the basis  for,  the humanistic
development of peacemaking criminology.   As Wozniak (2000) has argued
in illustrating Erich Fromm's relevance  for PMC,  a humanistic-based
perspective can become a powerful  tool in "sensitizing criminologists
to the ways ways that alienation  penetrates the fabric of macro-level
social institutions and,  on the micro-level,  the lives and minds of
individual actors."  Anderson (2000),  too,  cogently illustrates the
humanistic,  non-violent underpinnings of Marxian-informed theory and
practice by integrating Marx,  Critical Theory,  and Fromm to develop
the peacemaking  potential of  Marx's ideas.    This provides  the
foundation of the  PMC project as one of  actualizing Marx's "species
     On the broadest level, then,  peacemaking criminology offers
     us a view of life in which,  negatively,  we seek to put an
     end to  violence,  to those  acts that deny  our persons
     validity,  that dismiss  who we are,  that  keep us from
     finding, as Kierkegaard might say "that self which one truly
     is" (Sullivan, email communication, Dec. 2, 1999).

     PRAXIS.   Finally, both Marxian and peacemaking perspectives view
the human actor  as the fundamental agent both in  social control and
social  change.   For  both,  existing  social arrangements  and
accompanying ideology constrain our ability to recognize,  articulate,
and act upon the sources of unnecessary social domination.   For Marx,
through our work on our "objective  world," we duplicate ourselves in
consciousness  and in  the "reality"  of  the social  structures,
institutions, and forms of interaction we create (Marx,  1975:  277).
Because this also reproduces the  conditions that restrict realization
of our full species potential and objectifies and degrades our species
life,  social action includes the inter-related tasks of transforming
both consciousness and social structure.  Peacemaking criminology also
emphasizes the  role of human agency  in the individual  and social
transformative process. However, unlike the Marxian perspective, which
focuses heavily on the need to  change structural arrangements as the
primary form  of praxis,  many  peacemakers adopt a  more idealist
approach,  and tend to view transforming individual consciousness and
existence as the first necessary step toward changing structure.  For
some,   altering the  social structure  begins  with a  spiritual
transformation of the human psyche,  which will direct our subsequent
     When our  hearts are filled with  love and our  minds with
     willingness to serve,  we will know what has to be done and
     how it is to  be done.  Such is the basis  of a NONVIOLENT
     CRIMINOLOGY (italics in original; Quinney, 1991: 12).
     Other PMC scholars,  however,  emphasize a more structural view.
In summarizing  the foundations of  PMC,  Mika provided  a succinct
summary of the  integrated necessity for examining  social structure
while  simultaneously  expanding conscious  understanding  of  the
peacemaking goal and ways to attain it:
     So we have said, I think, that:   1) Peacemaking criminology
     is premised on  developing an understanding of  the social
     bases of  structural and interpersonal violence  and their
     engine power in  its coat of many colors  that both creates
     and  perpetuates the  harms  in  contemporary life  that
     undergird human interactions and social arrangements.
          We have also said, I think, that:
          2)  Peacemaking  criminology is equally  premised on
     developing an understanding  of peace,  on finding  in our
     collective response to harms a justice that is participatory
     and inclusive,  attentive to the  root causes of harms and
     their prevention,  driven by the  satisfaction of needs and
     achievement of equal well-being (Mika, 1999b).
     Despite congruences,   there are,   of course,   substantial
differences  between Marxian  and  peacemaking perspectives.   By
identifying similarities, we do not minimize difference, especially at
the theoretical level.  For example, few peacemaking scholars have any
interest in such fundamental Marxist theoretical issues as emphasis on
the commodity relations of capitalism,   the theory of surplus,  the
labor theory of value, necessity of class struggle,  or the tendential
decline in  the rate  of profit.   Yet,  substantial  theoretical
differences should  not obscure common  themes that overlap  in each
perspective, that illustrate that the two are not only compatible, but
also converge on many fundamental points.
     The criticism  that the  peacemaking perspective  is inherently
conservative because it shares the  functionalist core assumption that
societies are based on consensus reflects at least three errors.  The
first is a fatal false analogy:  That two perspectives employ similar
concepts does not  make them homologous such that  they share similar
domain assumptions or premises. To suggest that functionalists and PMC
adherents  employ  "harmony"  or  "consensus  similarly  confuses
functionalism's assumptive concept with PMC's  prescriptive use of the
term as both an ideal state and a form of transformative praxis.
     Second,  functionalism,  a macro theory for understanding social
structure,  deemphasizes micro-analytical issues and the significance
of the human agent in creating, maintaining,  and changing the social
order (Wallace and Wolff, 1999).   The PMC perspective,  by contrast,
combines macro-micro analysis  by focusing on the  structural factors
that contribute to crime and the  conditions that facilitate it and on
how oppressive conditions are recreated through language, status-based
interaction,  and ideology.   More importantly,  PMC emphasizes the
necessity of bottom-to-top social change and sees individual praxis as
one means by which to shape  a more harmonious,  less violent world.
     Finally,  despite the iterative power  of the "functionalism is
conservative!" mantra,  nothing inherent in  either the background or
domain  assumptions of  functionalism  require  such an  immutable
conclusion.   In attempting to develop a neo-functionalist theory that
overcomes the criticism of conservatism, Alexander (1998)  identifies
several congruences  between neo-functionalism and  neo-Marxism.  He
argues that functionalism can readily  be reformulated to develop its
conflict and critical potential.   In fact, a cogent argument could be
made  that functionalism  is  consistent  with a  radical/humanist
     If there is some wisdom in the saying, "You have to know the
     system to  beat the system,"  then functionalism  can help
     those who are dedicated to radical social change to a fuller
     understanding of how the system  operates (Wallace and Wolf,
     1999: 65).
     Some  critics  contend that  peacemaking  criminology  lacks
credibility not only because it is  not "science," but also because it
offers nothing that religious groups had not offered earlier:
         Long  before the  peacemaking  criminology label  was
     adopted by Pepinsky,  Quinney,  and others,  the in-prison
     religious programs and  the many prison ministries  run by
     churches and lay groups  were practicing peacemaking;  they
     have  long applied  the  tenets  of love  and  peaceful
     reformation of  offenders,  by  persuading them  toward a
     religious  commitment  and lifestyle  incompatible  with
     committing crime and causing suffering (Akers, 1997: 183).
     The judgment that peacemaking  criminology represents little more
than a secular repackaging of religion is unconvincing.   Although PMC
principles and  programs dovetail nicely  with the agendas  of many
religious organizations,   at least three characteristics  set them
apart.   First,  unlike most religous  organizations such as prison
ministries and  similar groups  that use  carceral institutions  as
recruiting grounds (e.g., Colson, 1978), PMC strategies do not promote
acceptance of a formal doctrine,  but rather advocate humanism as form
or social change.   Second,  religous  organizations tend to have a
narrower action focus, one that rarely extends to broad social issues.
Third,  PMC has a wider range  of actions on more levels.   Finally,
religious factions attempt to establish  and maintain peace among its
members,   but in  doing so  tend  to promote  out-group/in-group
     A more devastating criticism of PMC  lies in the accusation that
it is unamenable  to empirical assessement.   Defense  of empirical
credibility might strike especially those PMC proponents influenced by
Romanticism as unnecessary, even anathema, because it saps energy that
could be invested in promoting the concept of peace.  However, because
the perspective  is being pursued by  academics who try  to persuade
other academics of the viability of the perspective,  we offer several
reasons  why  peacemaking advocates  should  encourage  empirical
assessment of peacemaking principles and programs.  First, peacemaking
is presented  as an intellectual positionn;   therefore,  rigorous
scholarship would promote, not hinder, its development.  Second,  new
scholars  accepting  academic  positions  where  tenure  requires
publication may be discouraged from pursuing a line of inquiry that is
seen as neither rigorous nor intellectual,  but instead is viewed as a
conversation among co-ideologues.   Third,   supporting evidence is
useful when  making claims.    Therefore,  substantiating  that a
peacemaking alternative is  "better" than the present  model requires
more than prophetic rhetoric, sermonizing,  or homilies.  Credibility
depends on evidence.  Fourth,  policy formulation and implementation
require evidence to answer the question: "What works?"
     Critics  correctly  adduce the  difficulty  of  operationally
conceptualizing the concept  of peace to underscore  the testability
problem.   However, conceptualizing the concept of "peace" is no more
difficult than  epidemiologists' attempts to  operationalize "health"
when  alleviating suffering  by  identifying  symptoms and  their
hypothesized source.  Peacemakers might argue that their goal isn't to
engage in research or test hypotheses,   but rather to transform the
world through social action.   That  these advocates dismiss the need
for conventional research is not dispositive of the possibility of it.
In fact,  the utility of peacemaking  criminology is no less testable
than the tenets of any other criminology perspective, such as symbolic
interaction, labelling theory, or rational choice models.   If,  for
example,  we posit a relationship between social inequality and crime,
a reasonable hypothesis, then testability becomes easier.  If we posit
that,  to reduce crime,  criminal  justice agencies should implement
policies  or programs  associated  with  PMC such  as  education,
victim-offender reconciliation,  restorative  justice practices,  or
conflict mediation,  then we can readily  test the outcome with such
conventional quantitative  or qualitative methods,   as comparative
analysis or  experiments.   We could also  take a random  sample of
communities that implement  restorative justice in a  similar fashion
and compare those  with demographically similar communities  that do
     Identifying and testing factors that are associated with peace is
equally possible.  Do social responses to crime that are less punitive
than  incarceration lead  to such  possible  outcomes as  reduced
recidivism, less serious offending,  or other measurable consequences?
Do programs  built around social  responsiveness have  the expected
consequence of reducing  suffering?  Does reduced suffering  lead to
reduced crime?   Does the reduction of racism or sexism in a community
or within experimental  groups lead to reduced  crime or recidivism?
Does implementation of empathy therapy  rather than obedience training
have a similar outcome?
     Quinney (2000:  21),   often considered the most  spiritual of
peacemaking scholars,  has  observed that "What is  important in the
study of crime  is everything that happens before  the crime occurs."
Despite the vagueness of the observation,  it nonetheless is grounded
in a domain assumption that a  discernable set of factors generates a
particular outcome,  and that by altering  those factors we alter the
outcome.   Whether the  precedents of crime are  grounded in social
structure or human agency,  and whether reshaping those precedents by
reducing shame, suffering, or unfairness is irrelevant.  What matters
is that  the action-oriented  philosophy of  peacemaking criminology
generates a  number of testable  claims.   For this  reason,  the
perspective clearly has the potential to be more than "a vague utopian
vision" of little explanatory use for understanding or fighting crime.
It contains rich possiblities for  understanding the etiology of crime
and identifying remedies that are  testable through either the canons
of normal science or Deweyian pragmatism.
     The intent  of this  section has  not been  to overcome  the
criticisms we identify, but rather to suggest directions for resolving
them.  Even if resolved, however, peacemaking criminology still faces
the perception that it is excessively ideological and therefore cannot
appeal to mainstream scholars or  practitioners.   The final question
remains: "So what?"
                Peacemaking as Criminal Justice Praxis
     We have so far argued  that peacemaking criminology is consistent
with Marxian/radical  theory,  that  it bears  no resemblance  to
functionalism,  and that it is fully amenable to empirical evaluation
and critical  assessment.   In this  section,  we address  the two
remaining criticisms by illustrating how,  through the variety of ways
in which it  is being implemented,  PMC is  neither conservative nor
chaotic.   By identifying ways it has been implemented, we address the
"chaos syndrome" by suggesting that critics and advocates alike should
pay more attention to practioners who, while not as visible as some of
the high-profile  advocates,  are more  deserving of  attention as
exemplars who implement PMC principles.
     If the  peacemaking perspective  is to be  more than  merely a
rallying mantra,  then it should  have direct policy implications for
the criminal justic system,  or ate least peripheral implications for
societal change  that would bring the  system more in line  with the
vision of peace  and love.   Some critics  suggest that peacemaking
criminologists,  while effusive about the good,  the true,  and the
beautiful,  are  too muddle-minded  to offer  anything of  policy
significance (Akers, 1997: 183).   If correct, this criticism would be
fatal.   Fortunately, as the articles in this volume and elsewhere and
various  demonstration projects  attest,  this  criticism is  not
sustainable.   To  compartmentalize PMC into the  standard criminal
justice components of police, courts, and corrections does violence to
both to the perspective and its application.  In practice, peacemaking
efforts are geared toward breaking  down the conceptual barriers that
narrow our  thinking and to expanding  our thinking to  see criminal
justice agencies as interconnected with and grounded in broader social
processes.  Fuller's (1998) four-fold typology suggests several levels
on which peacemaking criminology could be or has been implemented.
     The broadest  level involves organization  around international
issues that can be addressed locally. The second, institutional, level
includes focusing  on governmental agencies (especially  the criminal
justice system), political or social structures,  or embedded cultural
practices (such as racism or sexism).   Third,  interpersonal action
invites assessing and changing how people interact with one another in
ways  that enhance  what  Habermas  (1981)  recognized  as  the
intersubjective  forms of  domination that  repress realization  of
individual and group potential.   Finally, the intra-personal level is
a   call  for   individual   transformation  and   individual
     INTERNATIONAL/GLOBAL ACTION.   Some PMC  advocates begin with a
macro-level analysis  that requires  fundamental changes  in social
structure as  a way of establishing  the foundations for  creating a
peaceful social order.   Following the adage  that "none can be free
until all are free," a balanced  and harmonious existence at the micro
level  cannot   occur  without  recognizing  the   origins  of
socially-structurally induced violence (Gil,  1999).   On the global
level,   peacemaking  criminologists  offer  a  vision  of  an
interconnectedness between all things, similar to the Marxian doctrine
of  internal relations.   This requires  making governments  more
responsive to  its own people  as well  as people affected  by its
policies,  and to oppose war or other  means of violence as a way to
pursue social justice (Cullen,  1999).   The goal,  as Elias (1991)
argues,  is to work for peace by  promoting human rights both on the
streets and among nations.   One way  to do this between conflicting
political groups is by recognizing that all parties share an equitable
status in the process,  identifying common ideological ground on which
to build a  lasting commitment to peace,   and implementing  future
conflict-resolution mechanisms (Currie and MacLean, 1995: 100).
     INSTITUTIONAL/SYSTEMIC ACTION.    At the  institutional level,
peacemaking  challenges  unresponsive and  repressive  systems  of
government, economic systems,  religious systems.   By examining how
institutions have developed and how  they implement rules and policies
and create  the ideological  and related  apparatus necessary  for
control, action can take many trajectories.   Groups working to reform
the criminal justice system,  such  as prison reform and anti-capital
punishment organizations, community/police neighborhood councils,  and
similar collectives provide  one line of direct  action.  Caulfield
(1999)  nicely demonstrates the  variegated peacemaking intersections
between feminism, the military,  and criminal justice for research and
policy.   Grassroots projects also provide  a short-term strategy for
promoting social justice, as Barak (1991)  illustrated in his study of
a community-based homeless shelter.
     Institutional action can occur within the criminal justice system
in many ways.  In law enforcement agencies, community policy, enhanced
informal dispute resolution,  and  police-community involvement are a
few viable options.    For example,  although aware  of political,
practitioner, and other barriers, Volpe (1991) suggests police-citizen
mediation programs as one way of implementing peacemaking practices in
the criminal justice system.   This,   she argues,  would shift the
emphasis from an  adversarial process to one  of conflict resolution
between disputants.   At the judicial level,  peacemaking criminology
offers a way  to move from the current punitive  model of retributive
justice to one based on responsiveness  to the needs of society,  the
victim, and the offender. Although some peacemakers reject the concept
of punishment and confinement,  most do not,  and neither concept is
incompatible with PMC. The goal is to balance the needs of all parties
rather  than exact  a "just  measure  of pain."   Prison-oriented
peacemaking activity includes  working for the attrition  of prisons
(Knopp 1991),  "Alternative to Violence  Projects" in which volunteer
facilitators  enter prisons  to conduct  workshops on  restoration,
healing, and emphasizing individual responsibility (Bitel, 1998),  or
developing peace-oriented self-help or  "healing" programs that teach
nonviolence (Rucker, 1991).
     Community-oriented  examples  of a  peacemaking  process  are
reflected in neighborhood associations, "peacemaking courts" of native
Americans such as the Navajo (Pepinsky, 1998a:  3) or other indigenous
societies (Melton, 1995; Tomaszewski, 1997).  Fuller (1998) develops a
list of  additional social/institutional  level targets  for policy,
including drug  legalization,  opposition  to capital  punishment,
increased emphasis  on rehabilitation  of offenders,   expansion of
community policing, aggressive gun control,  implementing peacemaking
programs for youth,  especially as a way of dealing with gang culture,
and implementing peacemaking alternatives in the court system.
     INTERPERSONAL/INTRAPERSONAL ACTION.   The third and fourth levels
of Fullers's (1998)   action typology focus on  individuals as they
interact with  others and  as they  engage in  their own  personal
development.   At the interpersonal  level,  peacemaking criminology
invites  reflection on  the ways  in which  power asymmetries  are
recreated and maintained in every social encounter.   Once recognized,
the goal is to change attitudes  about and ways of social interaction.
At this level, PMC:
     ....has to do  with a way of  life and a choice  to live a
     certain way with and among others,   a way that refuses to
     seek and exercise power and  that means ultimately redeeming
     our words and selves out of the marketplace (Sullivan, 1999,
     personal Communication).
     Finally, the intrapersonal level refers to how we treat ourselves
and invites personal transformation.   Knopp (1991:  184) argues that
the first step in social change is consciousness raising,  "or seeing
the need for  the new." This requires "learning how  to organize and
construct the new," which she sees as a new restorative-justice model,
especially in crimes of sexual aggression and violence.  Growth on the
intrapersonal level requires that we be gentle, forgiving,  and learn
how to make peace with ourselves (Fuller, 1998: 41).
     Activity on these four levels overlaps and builds off the others.
One effective way to integrate them is through education,  especially
the promotion of wholistic peace education (Mackey, 1998)  or justice
literacy (Brush, Caulfield, and Snyder-Joy,  1998;  McEvoy and Mika,
1998; Sanzen, 1991; Sullivan, Tifft and Cordella, 1998). Such programs
combine to promote individual growth  while raising consciousness that
alters  behaviors and  suggests avenues  for  systemic and  global
participation.   A second  way to integrate peacemaking  in criminal
justice,  and one that is beginning to receive attention by mainstream
practitioners (Boyes-Watson, 1999),  is programs based on restorative
justice.   As Sullivan and Tifft (1998) remind us, restorative justice
is intertwined with all levels of existence, including the work place,
home,  and  in interpersonal  communication.   This  suggests that
restorative justice transcends the reactive  component of the criminal
justice system,  making it a powerful integrative approach (Bazemore,
     We have argued that, although peacemaking criminology has not yet
overcome many of the problems that keep it out of the mainstream, many
of the  criticisms either  lack foundation  or can  be successfully
addressed.   We also  identified  several  ways that  peacemaking
criminology has been  or can be implemented in  the criminal justice
system.  However,  this  still has not brought us to  closure to a
definition or summary of the perspective.  That we attempt in the next
                       Peacemaking as Metaphor
     Many of  the definitional  and other  problems of  peacemaking
criminology dissolve  if,  rather  than demand  a clearly  focused
definition,  we instead see the peacemaking perspective as a metaphor
that juxtaposes Pepinsky's  (1998a)  imagery of war,   violence and
conflict against that of harmony,  reparation,  and healing.   When
understood as a cognitive mapping  device,  the perspective becomes a
lens through  with which  to reframe  and suggest  alternatives to
existing responses to social offense and control.
     Different metaphors  produce different  sets of  images through
which to view, interpret, and act upon our world.   Metaphors provide
icons and  mapping techniques for  interpreting and acting  upon the
social terrain.   Metaphors also allow us  to examine and discuss our
objects from several perspectives,  employing various sets of images.
This expands our concrete knowledge of,  as well as our insight into,
the topic of choice.   By replacing the  metaphor of war with that of
peace,  we redirect our gaze to  an alternate recoding of aspects of
social existence into a more fruitful  set of images.  To paraphrase
Brown's (1976:   178) observation in a related context, the choice is
not between scientific rigor and peacemaking criminology,  but between
more or less fruitful metaphors,   and between rejecting metaphors of
violence or being their victims.
     Like  all critical  metaphors,  that  of peacemaking  directs
attention to  symbols of  oppression and  suggests strategies  for
reconceptualizing crime and social control  and their relationship to
our fundamental social existence.   As metaphor,  even the excessive
hyperbole of some of the more extreme commentators is more easily seen
as  bathos,  a  rhetorical trope  by which  mundane discourse  is
exaggerated to produce richer images of analytic significance.   As a
metaphor,  peacemaking criminology is both a sensitizing concept and a
set of  heuristic images that  become transformative elements  in a
dialetical process of changing both  individual consciousness and the
social conditions that bread unnecessary  forms of social domination.
As metaphor,  peacemaking criminology may best be seen as a means for
coalition  building.   It  cuts across  ideological boundaries  by
suggesting forms  of praxis that range  from something as  simple as
creating new  forms of consciousness at  one end to  more idealistic
calls for fundamental social, political,  and cultural changes on the
     Finally,  the metaphor of "peacemaking"  merges the Romantic and
Enlightenment intellectual  traditions into  a dialectical  blend of
science and spirit.  By recognizing the power of the metaphor to unify
two ways of viewing, thinking about, and acting upon our existence and
our social  world,  it becomes easier  to understand that  the two
traditions are not in opposition, but supplement each other.   Our own
exploration of peacemaking  criminology led us to  three conclusions
that, for us, helped clarify the perspective.   First, PMC constitutes
a paradigm shift, or a new direction for developing theories, methods,
concepts, and forms of action for reducing crime.   Second, PMC offers
a  redemptive  rejuvenation for  criminal  justice  practitioners,
scholars,  and offenders.   Finally,  the perspective challenges our
thinking not only about crime,  but about the fundamental foundations
of our social existence.
     Our final assessment of peacemaking  criminology reflects not so
much a conclusion,   but rather a beginning,  a  redemptive call to
action.   Ultimately, the value of peacemaking,  whether grounded in
criminology or some  other enterprise,  lies in the  degree to which
individuals can transform themselves,  their interactions,  and their
social institutions away  from a violent and  hostile environment and
toward one that is more conducive to fulfilling the "species being" of
which Marx spoke.   As a consequence,   the criticisms that PMC is
utopian, idealistic, and ambitious remain valid.  However, these
should be considered attributes rather than weaknesses.   Peacemaking
is nothing less than an integrative  new beginning.  The metaphor of
peace guides  the interplay between self-transformation  and broader
social change,  and provides a powerful  weapon of critique in doing
battle against violent metaphors and actions.
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